I. INTRODUCTION
This book chapter studies the evolution of statutory property law in Taiwan. 1 That is, what drives the large-scale overhauls of the Book of Things-Book III of the Taiwan Civil Code-during 2007 Code-during -2010 and whether the amendment produces more efficient legal rules. Unlike Demsetz (1967) , Krier (2009) , Levmore (2002) , and others who study the evolution of property rights, this chapter focuses not on why resources change from being held in commons to being held exclusively by one or a few private parties, but on why statutory property laws are amended, 2 which may or may not involve privatization. Levmore (2002) 's analytical framework is the starting book for this chapter. Levmore (2002: S451) points out that " [t] he content of private property is itself a function of government, and virtually all legal moves need to be analyzed in terms of both transaction costs and interest groups." This chapter will examine whether the statutory amendment was driven by interest groups, and to what extent the new law has increased economic efficiency. "Normative judgments about the role of government in maintaining and transforming property arrangements must depend on local evidence about given pieces of property, industries, and so forth" (Levmore 2002: S451) . In order to unveil the driving force behind the amendment of property law in Taiwan, this chapter presents descriptive statistics and interviews, and digs into archives of legislative hearings and meeting minutes of the task force in charge of proposing bills to the legislature.
The transaction cost versus interest group stories can be aligned in another dimension: formal versus informal property rights. The transaction cost story more easily explains the emergence of informal property rights in "relatively close-knit, egalitarian communities" (Merrill 2002: S338) , such as fur rights in Indian tribes (Demsetz 1967 ) and rights of parking space during storm in secondary streets in Chicago (Epstein 2002) . Social norm theory could well complement the transaction cost story (for example adding in a norm entrepreneur) in explaining the emergence of property customs (Ellickson 1991) .
By contrast, interest group theory can more easily explain contemporary changes in formal property rights (particularly those through amendments of property-related statutes, such as land use regulations and civil codes). 3 Since 1 Official English translation of the Taiwan Civil Code is available at http://law.moj.gov.tw/Eng/LawClass/LawContent.aspx?PCODE=B0000001. 2 For the disconnection between the economics of property rights and the economics of property laws, see Lueck and Miceli (2007: 187) . 3 Compare Wyman (2005) 's approach that emphasizes the role of political institution in establishing property rights (individual transferable quota in fishery) in order to increase interest groups are more likely to benefit from privatization or reallocating entitlements than devolution into commons (Levmore 2002: S429) , and given that elected legislators generally do not amend law to improve efficiency (Levmore 2002 : S428), we can expect that changes in property statutes tend to benefit the politically powerful at the expense of the politically weak.
Yet the Book of Things in the Taiwan Civil Code is no ordinary statutes. The Book contains many general and abstract doctrines such as the doctrine of first possession that is unlikely to greatly affect the wealth of many people. The costs of overcoming the collective action problem (Olson 2009 ) are likely to outweigh the tiny benefit each participant receives. Even for big landowners, statutes regarding property taxes, land use regulation, urban renewal, eminent domain, etc. involve higher stakes than the mostly "technical" stipulations in the Taiwan Civil Code. Thus, even though the politically powerful may be able to bully the politically weak, it might not worth the former's time and resource to do that in amending the Taiwan Civil Code.
Against this backdrop, this chapter deals with the issue of who else then drives the legislative amendments in [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] . After all, elected representatives, as part of the interest group politics, are unlikely to initiate by themselves the unsexy amendment of the Taiwan Civil Code, as that will not result in much campaign contributions or votes in the next election. My story is that the jurists drive the legal change. To be more exact, the scholarly judges 4 and property law scholars dominate the amendment process.
One of the oldest and longest debate in law and economics is whether and why the judge-made common law tends to become more efficient over time, while the legislator-made statutes do not (e.g. Posner 1973; Priest 1977; Rubin 1977 Rubin , 1982 Parisi 2004; Fon, Parisi, and Depoorter 2005; Ponzetto and Fernandez 2008; Niblett, Posner, and Shleifer 2010; Posner 2010; Zywicki and Stringham 2010; Garoupa and Ligüerre 2011) . In the U.S., an alternative expression of this dichotomy is that private laws tend to be efficient while statutory regulations tend to be inefficient (Posner 2010: 714-16) . 5 When applying this framework to civil law countries, where statutes are sources of private law, the first-order inquiry is whether private laws (civil codes) will be efficient because it deals with civil matters or whether they will be inefficient because they are enacted by legislatures. Another dimension would be to ask in economic efficiency. 4 I use the term scholarly judges to describe judges who either serve as adjunct law professors or publish legal textbooks. 5 Compare Rubin (1982: 207) which contends that the statute-common law distinction is one in time. That is, "in the early period most law was efficient and most law was common law. In the later period, most law was inefficient and most law was statute law." private laws, regarding the same legal problem, whether the doctrine in American common law or that in civil law tends to be more efficient. Chang (2013a), for example, finds that a code-stipulated property doctrine, access to landlocked land, in several European and Asian civil-law countries are more efficient that its counterpart doctrine in the U.S. common law. Garoupa and Ligüerre (2011: 308-21) contend the superiority of French law in terms of efficiency over the American law. Arruñada and Andonova (2008: 83) point out that both common law and civil law at their inceptions in the nineteenth century were both efficient adaptation to the local circumstances, and the civil law countries in the nineteenth century reserved more rule-making powers to the legislature, instead of the court, to preserve the market.
My study here on the evolution of property law in Taiwan further complicates this debate. I find that the legislature rubber-stamped the proposed bill sent from the executive branch, and this highly technical and sophisticated bill is the brainchild of an official task force consisting of property scholars and judges. In other words, the depressing story usually told by public choice theorists, such as legislative changes reflecting the narrow interests of lobbying groups and donors of campaign funds, is not applicable here. If the prima facie case against statutes in terms of efficiency is lifted, can we make a general prediction as to whether statutes like this will be welfare enhancing? 6 I am not ready to offer a grand theory. Yet my case study on the evolution of property law in Taiwan sings a positive note, as my observation is that the amendments of Book of Things are generally Kaldor-Hicks-improving. Of course, civil codes are special cases, so my findings may not be readily generalizable. But civil codes are important laws, so any theory on the general inefficiency of statutes should be able to explain them.
The structure of this chapter is as follows: Part II summarizes the current property law in Taiwan. Part III describes the changes of property law in [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] . Part IV discusses whether the new the Taiwan Civil Code is more efficient than its predecessor. Part IV concludes.
II. OVERVIEW OF CURRENT PROPERTY LAW IN TAIWAN
The original Taiwan Civil Code was enacted in 1929 and went into force in 1930 when the Nationalist Government still reigned China. In 1949, the defeated Nationalist government brought gold, treasures from the Forbidden City, millions of soldiers and officials, and enacted codes to Taiwan. The Taiwan Civil Code, in particular, continued to be the private law of the land without interruption. The Taiwan Civil Code was drafted with the assistance of Japanese consultants, and is heavily influenced by German and Swiss civil codes (see, e.g., Tsai 2000:54-55) .
The drafters also incorporated in the Taiwan Civil Code the "dian right," a traditional Chinese property right, and did not import usufruct and security interests that were adopted in the German Civil Code but distant from property practice in China.
The Taiwan (Chang 2012) , owners-in-common (similar to but not exactly the same as joint tenancy), and condominium. As a snapshot, on Feb. 11, 2011, 20 .5% of land parcels were co-owned, whereas 5.4% of apartments or houses were co-owned (see Figure 1 for the distribution of the number of co-owners). 7 Figure 1 The number of co-tenants in co-owned land and apartment/house Note: The unit for calculating co-owners in land is a land parcel with its own unique "land number." The unit for calculating co-owners in non-land real properties is one ownership right.
That is, if the whole building is subject to one ownership right, such as a house, the statistics here describe how many people share that right of ownership. If the building is a condominium, and divided into multiple apartments, because each apartment is subject to one ownership right, the statistics here describe how many people share that right of ownership in one apartment, not the ownership of the whole building.
Titles to, and lesser property interests of, real properties can be de jure transferred only after registration in the land registry. Taiwan, like Germany, adopts the Torrens registration system (Arruñada 2012: 72-73) . 8 Land registration is mandatory and the Department of Land Administration, Ministry of the Interior, has actively mapped land in Taiwan and put land in the registry. At the end of 2012, the total area of Taiwan is 36,192.82 square kilometers, 9 of which 3,493,7.12 square kilometers are registered. 10 That is, only 3.47% of land is unregistered (Figure 2 ), of which much is state land that is exempted by the 8 For a cliometric study that shows that introducing land registration in Taiwan under Japanese rule in the early twentieth century had increased legal certainty to title and thus increasing farmers' long-term investment, see Koo (2011 That is, they cannot register even if they want to. (The tax authorities seek out these fixtures and put them in the "tax registry" to levy property taxes.) These kinds of fixtures, called "illegal buildings" in Taiwan (Chang 2014g) and "small properties" in China (Qiao 2014 )(see also Qiao chapter in this book), cause courts in Taiwan a lot of trouble: numerous illegal buildings exist and were transacted, and yet legally speaking no formal property rights can change hand.
Since late 1950s, Taiwan Supreme Court was forced to create a new type of property rights, called "de facto disposal right." I will discuss this informal property rights in more detail in Chang (2014b) . easements (or servitudes) can be set between two land parcels. Now they can be set between any real property, such as between a house and a land parcel. Only easements appurtenant, but not easements in gross, are allowed (Su 2011:495-97) . No-competition easement never takes off in Taiwan; even passage easements are not prevalent. As Figure 7 shows, easements are stunningly infrequently used, 14 though a big jump in registration in 2013 is worth noting.
11 Wang (2010:347-48) points out that the demise of emphyteusis should be attributed to the large-scale land reform in the 1950s, during which the land-use laws stipulated that tenants received ownership-through eminent domain and "givings" (Bell and Parchomovsky 2001)-after twenty years of leasing. Permanent tenants, as a result, essentially disappeared. 12 Above-ground rights are a literal translation. Superficies can in fact be established for developments below land surface. See Article 832 of the Taiwan Civil Code. 13 Article 425-1: "The land and the house on such land belong to one person, he transfers only the ownership of land of the house to the other, or transfers the ownership of land and house simultaneously or in sequence to the different persons, the lease is presumed to be constituted between the transferee of the land or of the house and the person of transferor, or between the transferee of the house and of the land in the duration of the use of the house. The limitation of the period in the first paragraph of Article 449 shall not be applied." Article 838-1: "Where the land and a building on such land are owned by the same person, a superficies is deemed to have been created and to exist at the time when the land and the building are thereafter sold by auction of compulsory execution to different bidder, and the rental, term, and scope of the superficies shall be determined by agreement between the parties. If such an agreement cannot be reached, the parties can apply to a court for a judgment determining these. The same rule shall apply when either the land or the building is auctioned." 14 In 1999-2004, easements were established less than 300 times each year (Wang 2010:346) . (Chang 2014b) , which softens the 16 Unlike many other civil law countries, the Taiwan Civil Code explicitly treats security rights as types of property forms, rather than contractual forms or intermediate forms (Chang and Smith 2013  Both pledges of things and pledges of rights are allowed in the Taiwan Civil Code, and thus the objects of property rights do not have to be corporeal things.
Pledge of rights is often used to borrow cash by pledging stocks. Pawn, the commercial pledge of things, is officially recognized by the Taiwan Civil Code in 2007 to be a special type of pledge, and is regulated separately. Pawn shops can be seen everywhere in Taipei City, the capital of Taiwan, with advertisements that claim "everything can be pawned." Pawn shops are also in the business of chattel mortgage, which is recognized as a property form by Personal Property Secured
Transactions Act. 17 The legislators of this Act borrowed this institution from the U.S. Only certain register-able personal properties, such as motor vehicles and vessels, can be mortgaged.
 Right of retention is strictly speaking a statutory pledge given to creditors who happen to be in possession of the lenders' movables when the latter defaults.
D. Dian, a Hybrid Form
A hybrid form, dian right, was rarely used in the past several decades. As Figure 11 demonstrates, dian rights are even more unpopular than the permanent tenancy right, and yet the legislature preserves this form and greatly amends the relevant stipulations in the Taiwan Civil Code, hoping to rekindle interests in dian right (Hsieh 2007:27) . were deleted, and 135 articles were revised for 137 times. 19 This part first describes the revision and then examines the driving force of it.
A. Source of (New) Law
Many laws in Taiwan were revised upon suggestions by the Executive Yuan (the cabinet) or the Judicial Yuan (responsible for supervising judges, etc.). Either
Yuan generally sends to the legislature a document that starts with an executive summary that is followed by a table that contains three columns: the current statutes, the proposed revisions, and the "underlying reasons" for amendment, article by article. That is, each amended article is accompanied by its own underlying reason. These reasons are not official (i.e. the legislature does not pass these reasons), but they are good sources for probing into the driving forces of legal changes. 
B. Legislature as Rubber Stamp
The two MOJ-convened task forces worked in a similar fashion (Hsieh 2007:18-19) : They met regularly to discuss the contents of the Book of Things, finished a first draft and circulated it widely to call for comments from other government agencies, professional guides and associations, and the civil society.
Based on the comments received, they worked on a second draft. MOJ would send the second draft to the Executive Yuan and the Judicial Yuan, which in only very few circumstances made minor changes of their own, and then sent the legislative proposal to the legislature. That is, the legislature was basically reviewing a bill that scholarly judges and scholars shape.
Did the legislature reject the proposal as too ivory-tower? As Table 2 shows, it did not. 226 of the 232 articles (97%) that the task force proposed to amend were quickly or eventually passed as proposed. The legislature made all five substantive revisions in 2009 regarding mortgage. One explanation for the isolated activism is that a group of legislators proposed its own bill based on concrete proposals by an independent group of property researchers, so deviating from the task-force version is also low-cost. Another possible explanation is that mortgage stipulations may greatly affect the business models and/or revenues for banks and real estate developers; thus, they may have lobbied under the table for or against certain revisions. Nonetheless, the big picture is that the legislature is only rubber-stamping the proposal by the task force. * Strictly speaking, the two self-initiating amendments are independent of the efforts by the MOJ to revise the Book of Things, as these two amendments are quick reaction to the popular outrage over a law student who found a lost object and requested a 10% payment allowed by the original law.
C. Legal Scholars as the Dominant Force
By now, it should be clear that scholarly judges and property professors the door for more information to be registered, and to make the registered information binding to third parties who are ignorant of the information.
A typical transaction cost story would by definition suggest that the new Book of Tings is more efficient, whereas a typical interest group story would cast doubt on whether the revised civil code increases social welfare. My story is at most an atypical interest group story. Law professors and scholarly judges could of course lobby for their own personal interests. But other than being known as the new framer of the revised Book of Things, the personal stakes involved in shaping the new civil code are rather low. As a result, these "framers'" worldviews might play a more important role. Their experience of pursuing a doctorate or master degree in law in foreign countries (most of them did) 25 and the fact that the Taiwan Civil Code is modelled after European civil codes partly explain why foreign laws are frequently cited as authorities in the underlying reasons. Given that there are much more law professors than judges in the second task force, the worldview story may also explain why "the conventional wisdom among legal scholars" is cited more often than Supreme Court precedents, which are legally more authoritative and practically more influential-albeit often criticized as flawed by scholars.
The worldview story is agnostic about whether the new code is more efficient than the old code. As at least two members in the task force (Yeong-Chin Su and Jer-sheng Shieh) frequently draw on property law and economics in their own writings, it is not entirely crazy to hypothesize that changes in civil codes could be Kaldor-Hicks-improving. In the next part, I discuss whether the Taiwan Civil Code evolves toward a more efficient system.
IV. TOWARD A MORE EFFICIENT PROPERTY LAW
To render conclusive evaluation of whether Taiwan moves toward a more efficient property system is apparently beyond the scope of this book chapter.
But I shall offer a general observation and discuss in more detail two examples in the following sections.
Generally speaking, the reform of the Book of Things increases efficiency.
Most amendments "address local problems under local restrictions and specific determinants" (Garoupa and Ligüerre 2011: 291) and can be considered successful. Regarding security rights, in particular the widely used mortgage rights, the new law clarifies many doctrines and officially incorporates maximum-amount mortgage and maximum-amount pledge of things. Legal certainty generally increases asset values. In addition, while the numerus clausus principle keeps information costs in check (Merrill and Smith 2000; Smith 2011 ), the number of property forms in Taiwan is so few that "frustration costs" are very high and desired transactions are hard to structure (Chang 2010) . To matter matters worse, without property-form trust and future interests, property law in Taiwan is hardly recursive (Smith 2011) . Arguably, the number of property forms in Taiwan suffers from two problems (Chang : 1278 . First, for the co-owners who plan to contract for a covenant, the value of it is uncertain, as the covenant may not bind a good-faith transferee who could pop up anytime. Second, for many transacting parties who want no part of a restricting covenant, they will have to spend investigation costs to figure out whether any covenant exists (those who do not verify could be considered as the "could-have-known"). As far as movables are concerned, most of these investigations might be futile and investigation costs are thus wasted.
A. Reducing Information Costs and Inducing Cost-justified Information Gathering
The task force does not explicitly put reducing information costs in the center stage (reducing transaction costs does have a few cameo appearances in the underlying reasons), but quite a few new stipulations serve to reduce information costs. 29 In particular, the new Taiwan Civil Code allows several types of transactional terms (such as rent and limitations on the type of uses allowed) in superficies, servitude, agricultural rights, and mortgage to be registered, 30 and these covenants, once registered, have in rem effect and bind transferees. This can in a sense be viewed as "contractization of property rights" that gives flesh to the bone provided by the numerus clausus principle. Although these stipulations cannot be used to create new property forms, 31 they better empower transacting parties to tailor their needs in an in-rem fashion, and at the same time not over-loading informational burdens on potential transacting third parties. This shall enhance efficiency.
Traditionally, good-faith party is protected in property law, but the law and economic literature has started to distinguish between good-faith (without fault) and innocence (or negligently good-faith) (Landes and Posner 1996; Mackaay 2012; Sterk 2012; Chang 2013b) . Innocent, or negligently good-faith, parties are those who could have known certain facts had they expended some costs in verification, and the expected benefit of verification is higher than the cost. The A law professor who served in the task force has emphasized the import of the expansion of register-able information (Su 2012: 477, 493) . 30 See Articles 836-1, 836-2, 838, 850-3, 859-2, and 873-1 of the Taiwan Civil Code. 31 Article 826-1 of the Taiwan Civil Code allows registered covenants between co-tenants to run with the real properties (Chang 2012; Chang and Smith 2012) . This can be used to create new property forms (Su 2012: 475-480 Rule 2, and the new Taiwan Civil Code tinkers with the prerequisite and adds a "safety valve" (Smith 2009a (Smith : 2128 )-courts can remove the option of Rule 1 after considering public and private interests.
Specifically, the new boundary encroachment doctrine is as follows: the entitlement of the neighbor (whose land is trespassed) is generally protected by the property rule when the encroachment is intentional or grossly negligent, if the neighbor immediately objects to the trespass upon being aware of it. The entitlement, however, is only protected by the liability rule if the neighbor fails to promptly notify the negligent trespasser of her disapproval. And under the liability rule, the neighbor can either request the encroacher to purchase "the part of the trespassed land" and "the odd lot caused by the trespass" at a "reasonable price," or request payment for her losses. As a "safety valve," if the trespass is unintentional, the court, after taking into account public interests and both parties' interests, may switch from the property rule to the liability rule. The boundary encroachment doctrines apply to residential buildings and apply mutatis mutandis to other types of buildings that are "similarly valuable."
In Chang (2013d), I argued that the new boundary encroachment doctrine can better increase social welfare if the aforementioned stipulations can be interpreted in the following ways: First, no matter the construction is completed or not, the prompt protest rule applies. Second, under the liability rule, the encroacher should pay rent, rather than torts damages, to the neighbor. Third, the reasonable price should be fair market value, not the underassessed official land value currently used by the court. Fourth, the precondition for the court to use the safety valve is that the encroaching part of the building is more valuable than the part of the trespassed land. The "public interest" that the court should take into account is the social benefits external to both parties' interests. Fifth, property owners usually attach subjective value to their residence. The "similarly-valuable buildings" that can be protected by Article 796 should have positive subjective value, too, whereas the "similarly-valuable buildings" that can be protected by Article 796-1 need to be valuable (with or without a positive subjective value).
It is worth noting that under the new doctrine, the prompt protest rule does not apply when the trespasser is bad-faith. This is an application of the ex ante viewpoint (Bebchuk 2001; Brooks and Schwartz 2005; Smith 2009b ), which is emphasized by law and economics to increase long-term efficiency. One can reasonably agree or disagree as to whether the exception should also apply to negligently good-faith trespassers, given the fact that nowadays checking out real estate information (including boundaries) in the registry becomes extremely easy in Taiwan (Chang 2013c) , and official survey, which is generally required before a builder applies for a building permit, is inexpensive (less than $150 for most landowners) and definitive in setting land boundaries. A similar concern emerges as to whether the safety valve (a judicial taking of the neighbor's right to exclude) is desirable when the trespasser is innocent but not good-faith.
Although ex post analysis usually takes the back seat in law and economics, During that time frame, courts in Taiwan determined boundary encroachment cases in the following pattern: If part of the buildings encroaches the land boundary, but tearing it down would not affect "the economic value of the whole building," courts would order the encroaching part removed. Courts rarely explicitly consider whether the trespasser is intentional, (grossly) negligent, or no-fault. It is difficult for the encroachers to persuade the court that the neighboring landowners fail to protest promptly. Courts consistently use the product of official land value and an ad hoc yield rate as compensation to the landowners. The official value, however, is much lower than market value, and the yield rates (from 1% to 10%, with 5% and 8% as the modes) do not appear to correlate with any legitimate index or standard finds that courts suffered from the anchoring effect in determining yield rates, the anchor being plaintiffs' requests). Landowners seldom ask the trespassers to purchase the encroached land.
scholars proposed a bill of their own, the legislature made its only amendments to the task-force version of the bill. Hence, scholars and judges, particularly the former, could be considered as an interest group. One could also take the frequent references to academic writings as evidence that the task force behaves like an interest group.
To most, the term interest group connotes negative meaning, but interest groups do not always pursue narrow self-interests. With little personal stakes in the substantive contents of the Book of Things, the task force clears away anomalous doctrines, updates an oft-difficult-to-use code, and modernizes various stipulations. As a result of their efforts, the statutory amendment generally increases efficiency (yes, statutes can be efficient!). Ironically, in the few instances where the new law probably decreases social welfare, the task force drew on Supreme Court precedents as the rationales, and court precedents are the source of common law in the Anglo-American system. This book chapter does not argue that an exception in comparative law refutes the rule. Yet this study should at least be counted as a cautionary tale and add new fuels to the debate on the relative efficiency of court-made law and legislature-made law.
